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Abstract 
Destination countries have been resorting to selective immigration policies to 
improve migrants' quality. We propose a model that analyzes the effects of selective 
immigration policies on migrants' quality, measured by their wages at destination. 
Screening potential migrants on the basis of observable characteristics also 
influences their self-selection on unobservables that influences their wages. We 
show that the prevailing pattern of selection on unobservables influences the effect 
of an increase in selectivity, which can reduce migrants' quality when migrants are 
positively self-selected. 
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“Remarkably little is known about [...] whether the chosen policy, in fact, has
the desired outcomes in terms of the size and composition of the immigrant flow.”
George J. Borjas (2014), Immigration Economics
1 Introduction
Destination countries are deeply concerned about the composition and scale of incoming
migration flows as they contribute to shape both the overall economic impact of immigration
and its distributional effects. The economic literature has traditionally relied on market
prices to measure immigrants’ quality through their earnings upon arrival at destination, and
evidence of a fall in migrants’ initial earnings in recent decades1 has prompted debates around
the need to reform immigration policies in order to reverse this declining trend.2 Specifically,
a growing number of countries are moving towards immigration policies that screen potential
immigrants on the basis of their observable characteristics, such as education and language
proficiency (Bertoli et al., 2012), granting better chances of admission at destination to
applicants endowed with more desirable individual characteristics.
While the (narrow sets of) characteristics upon which potential migrants are selected are
related to their earnings at destination, it is important to acknowledge that some other rele-
vant determinants of migrants’ quality, such as ability and motivation, remain unobservable
for the immigration officers. These unobservable characteristics can enter into the decision
to self-select into migration (Roy, 1951; Borjas, 1987), so that the effectiveness of selective
immigration policies in raising migrants’ quality also depends on how they influence the
pattern of self-selection on unobservables. The possible impact of the out-selection mech-
anisms adopted by the countries of destination on the prevailing pattern of selection on
unobservables contributes to shape the ultimate effect of the immigration policy, as “educa-
tion accounts for only a small portion of the variance in earnings across workers, suggesting
that the nature of selection in educational attainment may not necessarily “transfer over”
to a more comprehensive measure of a worker’s human capital” (Borjas, 2014, pp. 29-30).3
1See, for instance, Borjas (1985) and Borjas and Friedberg (2009) for the United States, and Aydemir
and Skuterud (2005) for Canada.
2“Most discussions of immigration policy “run” with one of the facts about the economic impact of
immigration–that immigrants reduce the wage of native workers, or that more recent immigrants tend to be
relatively less skilled–to propose some type of reform in immigration policy.” (Borjas, 1999a, p. 182).
3Along the same lines, Kaestner and Malamud (2014) caution about the limits of “using individual
2
For instance, the analysis by Aydemir (2011) reveals that, as expected, the Canadian points
system effectively increases the average level of migrants’ education but that “immigrants
admitted for their skills do not necessarily perform better in the labor market.” (Aydemir,
2011, p. 451, emphasis added).4,5 This, in turn, suggests that a focus on observable skills
can produce only a partial, and possibly misleading, account of the effects of selective immi-
gration policies on migrants’ quality.
This paper proposes an extension of the seminal paper by Borjas (1987) to analyze how
selective immigration policies influence migrants’ quality when migrants are self-selected
on unobservables related to the earnings at destination. Specifically, we consider a two-
country model where potential migrants are heterogeneous with respect to both education
and ability and where the destination country imposes higher policy-induced migration costs
on uneducated potential migrants. We analyze the effect on migrants’ quality of a scale-
preserving increase in selectivity,6 which is defined as a reduction of migration costs for
educated applicants, matched by a simultaneous increase in moving costs for uneducated
ones that leaves the total scale of incoming migration flows unchanged.
The analysis reveals that the response of migrants’ quality to a scale-preserving increase
in selectivity hinges on the prevailing pattern of selection on ability. When immigrants are
positively selected on ability, so that migrants’ average (log) wage at destination exceeds
the corresponding (hypothetical) average wage of the non-migrants with identical observable
characteristics, then a scale-preserving increase in selectivity can reduce migrants’ quality
when selectivity is pushed too far. This occurs because the direct beneficial effect of the
policy change is thwarted by an opposite negative effect, due to the induced reduction in the
average wage of the educated migrants. We demonstrate that there is an optimal degree of
components of skill such as education to assess migrant selection with respect to skill” (p. 89).
4Antecol et al. (2003) question the ability of the Canadian immigration policy to improve migrants’
observable characteristics, as compared to the United States, using data from the 1991 Canadian population
census.
5Ambrosini and Peri (2012) find that the lower earnings of Mexican migrants to the United States with
respect to stayers are “mostly due to [selection] on unobserved wage-earning characteristics and not on
observed ones” (p. 147), while Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2011) and Kaestner and Malamud (2014) find
that a larger role is played by observables, with this latter paper also including measures of cognitive ability
among the observable characteristics.
6This is similar in spirit to Biavaschi and Elsner (2013) who analyze the welfare implications for the
sending and the receiving countries of a change in the pattern of migrants’ selection for a constant scale of
migration flows.
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selectivity in immigration policies when migrants are positively selected on unobservables,
and that further increases in selectivity are detrimental to migrants’ quality. No such a
perverse effect arises when the opposite pattern of selection on unobservables prevails, as the
direct positive effect of the policy change is reinforced by the ensuing increase in the average
wage of educated migrants.
This theoretical result is robust with respect to several extensions of the basic version of
the model. Specifically, we analyze the implications of (i) introducing general equilibrium
effects induced by migration, (ii) introducing unobserved heterogeneity in the preferences
for migration, (iii) considering that wages are only locally observable, and (iv) allowing for
a change in the informational structure of educated agents.
The forces at play in our theoretical model are related to the ones analyzed by Bertoli
and Rapoport (2015). In that paper, the effect of an expansion of the size of migration
networks on migrants’ selection on education depends on the endogeneity of the distribution
of education at origin with respect to variations in the prospect to migrate. The emphasis
put on the potentially perverse effect of selectivity on observables is reminiscent of results
in the moral-hazard multitasking literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). There, it is a
well-known result that designing high-powered incentive schemes on easily observable tasks
may lead the agent to divert effort from tasks that are more difficult to monitor and may in
fine hurt the principal. The same logic applies here to the different dimensions of migrants’
quality.
This paper is mainly related to two strands of literature. First, it is related to the
literature on migrants’ selection (Borjas, 1987; Antecol et al., 2003; Chiquiar and Hanson,
2005; Jasso and Rosenzweig, 2009; Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, 2011, 2013; Ambrosini and
Peri, 2012; Dequiedt and Zenou, 2013; Kaestner and Malamud, 2014), including the papers
that analyze the determinants of selection on education (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010;
Bertoli, 2010a; Beine et al., 2011). Second, it is also related to the papers that analyze the
influence of immigration policies on migrants’ selection on education, both from a theoretical
(Bellettini and Berti Ceroni, 2007; Docquier et al., 2008; Bertoli and Bru¨cker, 2011; Bianchi,
2013; Bertoli and Rapoport, 2015) and an empirical perspective (Antecol et al., 2003; Jasso
and Rosenzweig, 2009; Aydemir, 2011; Belot and Hatton, 2012).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3
analyzes the effects of selective immigration policies on migrants’ quality in a basic version
4
of our theoretical model, and Section 4 discusses the implications of a number of extensions.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We develop a random utility maximization model describing the location-decision problem
that potential migrants face. That model largely follows and extends Borjas (1987), which
is derived from the seminal contribution by Heckman (1979). Consider an origin country,
which is denoted with the subscript 0, with a population of mass one of agents, which are
indexed by i. We assume that the origin country’s population can be either educated (e) or
uneducated (u), with α ∈ (0, 1) denoting the exogenous share of educated agents. Agents
can choose between a domestic job in country 0 and a foreign job in country 1. Education
is an observable characteristic in both countries and influences agents’ wage. The expected
values of the domestic and foreign log wages verify µej − µ
u
j > 0 for j = 0, 1.
7
Other individual characteristics remain unobservable but also influence agents’ produc-
tivity in both countries. Specifically, we assume that wages in both countries and for both
education levels follow a log-normal distribution. More precisely, for agent i, with education
level l, in country j, we have:
ln(wlij) = µ
l
j + ǫij,
with j = 0, 1 and l ∈ {e, u}, and8
7Notice that µe
0
− µu
0
and µe
1
− µu
1
should not be interpreted as representing the causal impact of ed-
ucation on the (log) wages in the two countries, as educated agents might be non-randomly self-selected
on unobservables; the two terms simply represent the differences in the average log wage for educated and
uneducated agents when all of them are employed in either of the two countries, so that these differences
can also pick up differences in unobservables between the two group of agents. Endogenizing the choice of
education goes beyond the scope of the current paper.
8Borjas (1987) proposes a static model, which portrays migration as a one-time permanent decision.
Borjas (1999b) observes that (1) could be interpreted “as giving the distributions of the present value of the
earnings stream in each country”, as in Sjaastad (1962). The model can also be interpreted as describing a
sequence of repeated location choices, with time-invariant distributions for wages and no serial correlation
in the realizations of the stochastic components (Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, 2013).
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(
ln(wli0)
ln(wli1)
)
∼ N (µl,Σ), (1)
where
µ
l =
(
µl0, µ
l
1
)′
and Σ =
(
σ20 σ01
σ01 σ
2
1
)
.
We assume for simplicity that the covariance matrix of the bivariate normal distribution
of log wages is the same for educated and uneducated agents. The distribution of wages in
the two countries is assumed to be exogenous, so that migration does not produce general
equilibrium effects.
For agent i, opting for a foreign job requires paying a migration cost whose monetary
equivalent stands at Ci and which may include both pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs, such
as the psychological costs of being away from home. As in Borjas (1987), we assume that the
time-equivalent migration costs, defined as the ratio between Ci and the individual-specific
wage at origin wli0, do not vary across individuals with the same level of education.
9 This
implies that self-selection into migration is driven exclusively by observable and unobservable
factors that influence the wages in the two countries, while agents are not heterogeneous in
their preferences for migration due to non-wage factors.10
Wages are assumed to be remotely observable, so that agents decide whether to migrate
or not after observing the realizations of the stochastic component of domestic and foreign
wages.11 For an individual with level of education l ∈ {e, u}, migration represents a utility-
maximizing decision if and only if:12
ln(wli0) + π
l < ln(wli1),
9This implies that agents are heterogeneous with respect to the monetary equivalent of migration costs,
with Ci following a log-normal distribution that is perfectly correlated with w
l
i0
.
10The assumption of the invariance of time-equivalent migration costs is relaxed in Borjas (1999b); see
also Section 4.2 below.
11Bertoli (2010b) considers an alternative informational structure, with wages that are locally observable,
so that the decision to migrate is taken before observing the realization of ln(wi1). Implications of such an
alternative information structure are analyzed in Section 4.3 below.
12Borjas (1987) relies on the approximation, ln(1 + Ci/wi0) ≈ Ci/wi0, which is accurate only when Ci is
sufficiently close to zero, but the analysis of the whole model does not hinge on this approximation that we
do not retain here.
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where πl = ln(1+Ci/w
l
i0).
13 Educated and uneducated agents face different time-equivalent
migration costs. Specifically, we follow the literature (Schultz, 1975; Chiquiar and Hanson,
2005; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010; Beine et al., 2011)by assuming that πe < πu. The
inequality above, which describes self-selection into migration, can be rewritten as:
ǫi2 ≡ ǫi1 − ǫi0 > µ
l
0 + π
l − µl1. (2)
The probability that (2) is satisfied is given by:
Pr
(
ǫi2 > µ
l
0 + π
l − µl1
)
= 1− Φ(zl), (3)
where Φ(.) represents the cumulative distribution of a standard normal and where
zl =
µl0 + π
l − µl1
σ2
,
with σ2 being the standard deviation of the differential ǫ2 between the two stochastic com-
ponents of the (log) wages. A (nearly) universal empirical regularity is that the propensity
to migrate is higher among individuals with tertiary education than among less-educated
individuals (see, for instance, Docquier et al., 2009). In terms of our model, this requires
that ze < zu. This condition does not require that the return to education is larger at
destination than at origin, i.e., µe1−µ
u
1 > µ
e
0−µ
u
0 , as a greater propensity to migrate among
educated agents could be induced by lower time-equivalent migration costs that they face.
Migrants represent a self-selected portion of the population at origin, so that the condi-
tional expectation of ln(wli1) among the migrants in general differs from the unconditional
expected value µl1. The assumption of bivariate normality implies that (Heckman, 1979;
Borjas, 1987):
E
[
ln(wli1)|ǫi2 > z
l
]
= µl1 + γλ(z
l), (4)
where γ is given by the covariance between the conditioning variable ǫ2, which drives the
decision to self-select into migration, and the stochastic component ǫ1 of ln(w
l
i1), scaled by
the standard deviation of the conditioning variable:
13With a minor abuse of terminology, we will be referring to π as time-equivalent migration costs.
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γ =
σ12
σ2
=
σ21 − σ01
(σ21 + σ
2
0 − 2σ01)
1/2
and where λ(·) represents the Inverse Mills ratio:
λ(z) =
φ(z)
1− Φ(z)
,
with φ(z) and Φ(z) being the density function and the CDF of the standard normal distri-
bution. The Inverse Mills ratio λ(z) gives the expected value of the upper tail of a standard
normal distribution truncated at z, and it is thus a positive and increasing function of z, as
shown in Figure 1. Furthermore, it can be shown that (Heckman, 1979, p. 157):14
∂λ(z)
∂z
= λ(z)[λ(z)− z] < 1, (5)
so that λ(·) is a contraction mapping, a property that will be used in our analysis below.
Figure 1: The Inverse Mills ratio
z
λ(z)
0
14The proof of the inequality in (5) indirectly follows from the fact that the variance of the upper tail of
the truncated standard normal distribution is equal to 1− ∂λ(z)/∂z.
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Borjas (1987) defines Q1 as the difference between the expected value of the distribution
of ln(w1) over the sample of migrants and the expected value of the entire distribution.
Adapted to our context with two levels of education, we have for l ∈ {e, u}:
Ql1 ≡ E
[
ln(wli1)|ǫi2 > z
l
]
− E
[
ln(wli1)
]
= γλ(zl). (6)
We say that migrants with level of education l are positively (negatively) selected on unob-
servables if Ql1 > 0 (Q
l
1 < 0). Remarkably, the sign of (6), and hence the pattern of selection
on unobservables, depends exclusively on γ. The assumption that the covariance matrix Σ
does not vary with l implies that the same pattern of selection on unobservables characterizes
both educated and uneducated migrants. However, the deterministic components of the log
wages µl0 and µ
l
1 and time-equivalent migration costs π
l determine the extent to which the
expected value of the foreign wages for the migrants differ from the unconditional expected
value; therefore this extent, related to the intensity of selection (Borjas, 2014), may differ
for the two groups. Letting the coefficient of correlation between ǫ0 and ǫ1 be denoted by
ρ01, we can rewrite γ as follows:
γ =
σ21 − σ01
σ2
=
σ0σ1
σ2
(
σ1
σ0
− ρ01
)
.
We immediately see that σ1 > σ0 represents a sufficient condition to have a pattern of
positive selection on unobservables, as |ρ01| ≤ 1.
Furthermore, (6) and the fact that λ(zl) is a monotonically increasing function of zl
imply that a marginal variation in zl increases (reduces) Ql1 when migrants are positively
(negatively) selected on unobservables. As zl is positively related to time-equivalent migra-
tion costs πl, this implies that a reduction in migration costs always dilutes the extent of
migrants’ non-random (either positive or negative) selection on unobservables. Formally, we
have that:
∂|Ql1|
∂π
= |γ|
[λ(zl)− zl]λ(zl)
σ2
> 0. (7)
This occurs because a reduction in πl increases the probability of migrating 1 − Φ(zl),
thus reducing the distance between the unconditional and the conditional expected value of
the distribution of ln(wl1), and hence the intensity of selection for group l.
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3 Selective immigration policies and migrants’ quality
As discussed in Section 2, migration costs are, at least partly, policy-induced by the recipient
country through the legal framework that regulates immigrants’ admission at destination. A
number of papers have modeled the influence of immigration policies on migration decisions
in terms of the monetary costs that they, implicitly or explicitly, impose. See, for example,
Giordani and Ruta (2013), Bianchi (2013) and Docquier et al. (2015).15,16
The random allocation of a fixed number of immigration visas through a lottery among
the applicants is an alternative way of modeling immigration policies. This allows represent-
ing selectivity through a variation in the probabilities of success in the lottery for different
groups of applicants (see Mountford, 1997, Beine et al., 2001, Bertoli and Br´’ucker, 2011 or
Bertoli and Rapoport, 2015). This type of selective immigration policy will not alter the
predictions of our model as long as there is a cost in participating in the migration lottery.17
Destination countries can impose different migration costs on potential migrants with
different observable characteristics, such as education. We assume that destination countries
have (possibly different) preferences both over the scale of immigration and over migrants’
quality. As in Bertoli and Bru¨cker (2011), we do not impose any structure on the trade-off
between migrants’ quantity and quality and we just assume that the objective function of
the destination country is increasing with migrants’ quality for any given scale of migration.
Migrants’ quality depends both on their observable and unobservable characteristics. Market
prices provide a natural way of combining the effects of both types of characteristics and
we follow the literature by defining quality as the average log wage that migrants earn at
destination.18 Thus, letting n and y denote the scale and quality of migration, we just
assume that (n, y2) ≻ (n, y1) if y2 > y1.
19
15Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Bertoli et al. (2013) recover the implicit migration costs that reconcile
observed migration flows with utility-maximizing destination choices.
16Sending countries can also impose policy-induced migration costs on their citizens, with the so-called
Mariel boatlift representing a famous instance of the effects of relaxing the barriers to emigration (Card,
1990). See also McKenzie (2007) for empirical evidence on the relevance of the costs of obtaining a passport.
17If participation in the lottery is costless, then out-selection mechanisms have no influence on self-selection
decisions.
18See, for instance, Borjas (1985) or Aydemir (2011).
19“[T]he relative skills of immigrants determine the economic benefits from immigration. The United
States benefits from international trade because it can import goods that are not available or are too
expensive to produce in the domestic market. Similarly, the country benefits from immigration because it
10
From (3), the scale of migration is given by:
n(πe, πu) = α[1− Φ(ze)] + (1− α)[1− Φ(zu)], (8)
where the notation is meant to emphasize the dependence of n on time-equivalent migration
costs. A change in time-equivalent migration costs πe and πu is scale-invariant if it does
not change the value of n(πe, πu) in (8). By totally differentiating (8), we see that a scale-
invariant change in migration costs satisfies:
∂πe
∂πu
=
∂ze
∂zu
= −
(1− α)
α
φ(zu)
φ(ze)
< 0. (9)
Let fk(π
u) represents the function, which is implicitly defined by (9), that provides us
with (if it exists) the unique value of πe, which gives rise to a scale of migration n(πe, πu) = k
when time-equivalent migration costs for uneducated individuals stand at πu. Formally, we
define a scale-preserving increase in selectivity as an increase in πu and a decrease in πe
satisfying πe = fk(π
u).
According to our definition, migrants’ quality is simply a weighted average of the condi-
tional log wages for the two types of migrants:
y(πe, πu) = se [µe1 + γλ(z
e)] + (1− se) [µu1 + γλ(z
u)] , (10)
where the share of educated migrants is given by se = α[1− Φ(ze)]/n(πe, πu).20
A scale-preserving increase in selectivity influences migrants’ quality y(πe, πu) through
two distinct channels: (i) it increases the share se of educated agents among the migrants,
whose log wages are drawn from a distribution with a higher expected value µe1 > µ
u
1 , and
(ii) it modifies the intensity of selection for both educated and uneducated migrants. While
(i) directly improves migrants’ quality,21 the influence of (ii) on quality can go in either
direction, and we demonstrate that a scale-preserving increase in selectivity can determine
can import workers with scarce qualifications and abilities.” (Borjas and Friedberg, 2009, p. 3).
20Notice that a scale-preserving increase in selectivity could be equivalently defined as an increase in se,
for a constant n(πe, πu).
21We are implicitly ruling out here the case, which is theoretically possible but empirically uninteresting,
where educated migrants earn less than uneducated migrants.
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an adverse effect on educated migrants’ selection on unobservables that offsets the positive
direct effect of the policy change, thus reducing migrants’ quality.
The following proposition contains the central theoretical prediction of our model:
Proposition 1 If migrants are positively selected on unobservables, then a scale-preserving
increase in selectivity reduces migrants’ quality if and only if πu−πe > 1−γ
γ
(µe1−µ
u
1)+(µ
e
0−µ
u
0).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 identifies the differential between πu and πe that maximizes migrants’ qual-
ity for a given scale of migration. When migrants are positively selected on unobservables,
then a scale-invariant increase in selectivity that pushes πu−πe above the quality-maximizing
value of 1−γ
γ
(µe1 − µ
u
1) + (µ
e
0 − µ
u
0) reduces migrants’ quality, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Migrants’ quality y[fk(π
u), πu)] and πu − πe
πu − πe
y[fk(π
u), πu)]
0 1−γ
γ
(µe1 − µ
u
1) + (µ
e
0 − µ
u
0)
k3
k2
k1
Note: the figure represents the evolution of migrants’ quality along three iso-migration curves with
k1 < k2 < k3 when γ > 0.
While the patterns of selection on education and on unobservables can differ, Borjas
(2014) observes that it is unclear “why the relative rates of return to skills between any
12
two countries (which presumably drive the differential types of selection) should differ so
drastically between observed and unobserved skills.” (p. 34).22 This argument implies that
the prevailing pattern of positive selection on education that is observed in the data is likely
to be matched by positive selection on unobservables. Intuitively, the quality-maximizing
degree of selectivity (i) decreases with the strength of the positive selection on unobservables,
which is related to γ, and (ii) increases with the return to education µe0 − µ
u
0 that migrants
earn at origin. Notice that the differential between πu and πe that maximizes migrants’
quality does not depend on the scale of migration. This implies that a change in immigration
policy that is meant to change the scale n(πe, πu) of incoming migration flows should always
keep πu − πe = 1−γ
γ
(µe1 − µ
u
1) + (µ
e
0 − µ
u
0). Recall that the migration rates of educated
and uneducated individuals stand at 1 − Φ(ze) and 1 − Φ(zu) respectively, so that the
quality-maximizing share of educated migrants, which we denote by sen, does vary with n.
Specifically, it is straightforward to see that:
∂sen
∂n
= (1− sen)s
e
n
(
λ[g(n)]− λ
[
g(n)−
µe1 − µ
u
1
γ
])
∂g(n)
∂n
< 0, (11)
where g(n) gives the (unique) value of zu that determines a scale of migration equal to n
when ze is at its quality-maximizing value.23 Hence, (11) implies that the share of educated
migrants that maximizes migrants’ quality is a decreasing function of the scale of migration
n: a destination country wishing to increase the scale of incoming migration flows should let
the number of uneducated migrants grow proportionally more than the number of educated
migrants. To put it differently, expanding the scale of migration exclusively (or mostly)
through an expansion of the number of educated migrants does not maximize migrants’
quality.
The perverse effect demonstrated by Proposition 1 arises because the scale-invariant in-
crease in selectivity reduces the conditional expected value of ln(wei1), while it increases the
conditional expected value of ln(wui1), as implied by (7). Nevertheless, migrants’ quality
begins to decline with a scale-invariant increase in selectivity already when educated mi-
grants earn, on average, more than uneducated migrants, as demonstrated by the following
22For instance, the analysis conducted by Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2011) uncovers a similar pattern
of (negative) selection on observables and unobservables of Mexican migrants to the United States.
23Notice that ∂g(n)/∂n < 0; this, together with the fact that λ(.) is a monotonically increasing function,
suffices to sign (11).
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Corollary to Proposition 1:
Corollary 2 The expected value of the log wage at destination is higher for educated than
for uneducated migrants when πu − πe = 1−γ
γ
(µe1 − µ
u
1) + (µ
e
0 − µ
u
0).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Corollary 2 demonstrates that an increase in selectivity can backfire even though educated
agents still have a higher wage than uneducated migrants.
No perverse effects of selectivity can arise when migrants are negatively selected on
unobservables, as demonstrated by the following Corollary:
Corollary 3 If migrants’ are negatively selected on unobservables, then a scale-preserving
increase in selectivity always increases migrants’ quality.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
A scale-preserving increase in selectivity unambiguously increases migrants’ quality when
migrants are negatively selected on unobservables, as it increases the differential in the con-
ditional expected value of the log wage for educated and uneducated migrants, an effect that
reinforces the direct positive effect of selectivity on observable characteristics on migrants’
quality. This, in turn, implies that the empirical relevance of our theoretical prediction that
more selective immigration policies can reduce migrants’ quality rests on the hypothesis that
migrants are positively selected on unobservables.
4 Extensions
We consider here four extensions of the basic specification of our model that do not influence
the theoretical prediction that a scale-invariant increase in selectivity can actually reduce
migrants’ quality. Specifically, we discuss the implications of (i) introducing general equilib-
rium effects, (ii) introducing unobserved heterogeneity in time-equivalent migration costs,
(iii) allowing for a greater role of uncertainty in the location-decision problem that agents
face, and (iv) considering a change in the informational structure for educated agents.
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4.1 General equilibrium effects
Our analysis assumes, as in Borjas (1987, 1999b), that the returns to observable and un-
observable characteristics in the two countries do not respond to migration flows, i.e., the
distributions of ln(wl0) and ln(w
l
1), with l ∈ {e, u}, are exogenous.
24 If we allowed wages at
destination to react to the scale of migration of educated and uneducated agents, then this
would strengthen the theoretical prediction contained in Proposition 1, as a scale-invariant
increase in selectivity would, through general equilibrium effects, reduce the difference in the
expected value of the two conditional distributions.25
4.2 Random variation in time-equivalent migration costs
We retained the assumption that time-equivalent migration costs do not vary across agents
with the same observable characteristics, so that self-selection into migration is based only on
(observed and unobserved) factors that influence the wages in the two countries. Still, people
“are often genuinely reluctant to leave familiar surrounding” (Sjaastad, 1962, p. 85) and “also
move for noneconomic reasons” (Chiswick, 1999, p. 184), and this calls for extending the
model with the inclusion of heterogeneity in the preferences for migration. We can follow
Borjas (1999b) by assuming that time-equivalent migration costs πli are determined by the
realization of a normal random variable, i.e., πli = µ
l
π + ǫiπ, possibly correlated with ǫi0 and
ǫi1. This extension implies that the probability to migrate is given by:
Pr
(
ǫ˜i2 ≡ ǫi1 − ǫi0 − ǫiπ > µ
l
0 + µ
l
π − µ
l
1
)
= 1− Φ(z˜l),
where z˜l =
[
µl0 + E(π
l)− µl1
]
/σ˜2 and σ˜2 = (σ
2
1 + σ
2
0 + σ
2
ǫ − 2σ01 + 2σ0π − 2σ1π)
1/2
. No-
tice that if the unobserved heterogeneity in the preferences for migration is uncorrelated with
the unobservables that influence wages, i.e., σ0π = σ1π = 0,
26 then |γ˜| ≡ (σ21 − σ01)/σ˜2 < |γ|,
as σ˜2 > σ2. The differential between the conditional expectation of ln(w
l
1) and µ
l
1 is equal
to:
24“We do not yet understand the nature of selection in a general equilibrium context.” (Borjas, 2014,
p. 213).
25This reasoning implicitly rests on the assumption of complementarity between educated and uneducated
migrants in the labor market at destination. Note that allowing for general equilibrium effects renders
problematic our reliance on the logarithm of migrants’ wages as a measure of their quality.
26“[T]he nature of the correlation between costs (whether in absolute or in time-equivalent terms) and
skills is unclear.” (Borjas, 2014, p. 10).
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Q˜l1 =
(
γ˜ −
σ1π
σ˜2
)
λ(z˜l). (12)
In the absence of covariance between the stochastic component of the log wage at des-
tination and the stochastic component of migration costs, then we obtain the same pattern
of selection on unobservables than in Section 2, but with |Q˜l1| < |Q
l
1| as |γ˜| < |γ| and
z˜l < zl. Intuitively, self-selection on noneconomic factors (preferences for migration), di-
lutes the extent of self-selection on unobserved ability. This, in turn, increases the scope
for quality-enhancing scale-preserving increases in selectivity when migrants are positively
self-selected on unobservables, i.e., Q˜l1 > 0, as the indirect adverse effect of the policy change
becomes weaker, as depicted in Figure 3.27
Figure 3: Unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for migration
πu − πe
y[fk(π
u), πu)]
0
1−γ
γ
(µe1 − µ
u
1) + (µ
e
0 − µ
u
0)
σπ = 0
1−γ˜
γ˜
(µe1 − µ
u
1) + (µ
e
0 − µ
u
0)
σπ > 0
Note: the figure represents the evolution of migrants’ quality for a given scale of migration
for two different values of σπ, with σ0π = σ1π = 0 and γ > 0.
The literature suggests that there is a negative correlation between migration costs and
27We have that the quality-maximizing share of educated migrants se
n
is an increasing function of σpi.
16
wages (see, for instance, Chiswick (1999), Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2007), Chiquiar and
Hanson (2005), McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) and Beine et al. (2011)) and this would widen
the scope for a positive selection on unobservables of the migrants. The term between brack-
ets in (12), which determines the pattern of migrants’ self-selection on unobservables, can be
positive even if γ˜ ≤ 0, when the correlation between time-equivalent migration costs πl and
ǫ1 is negative. Since a pattern of positive selection on unobservables represents a necessary
condition to obtain Proposition 1, introducing heterogeneity in preferences for migration
would strengthen our theoretical prediction under the empirically relevant assumption that
ρ1π < 0. The optimal differential between z
e and zu can be either above or below the value
that corresponds to the absence of heterogeneity in the preferences for migration.
4.3 An alternative informational structure
As in Borjas (1987, 1999b), we have assumed, that wages are remotely observable, so that
the information set upon which the decision to migrate is taken includes the realizations of
both ǫi0 and ǫi1. Bertoli (2010b) considers an alternative informational structure where only
ǫi0 belongs to the information set of the agents while the realization of ǫi1 is not observed
before migrating. Agents are assumed to know the parameters that characterized the bi-
variate normal distribution of ln(wli0) and ln(w
l
i1), so that the realization of ǫi0 conveys, in
general, information on the expected value of the stochastic component of ln(wli1). With this
alternative informational structure, the probability of migrating is given by:28,29
Pr
[(
σ1
σ0
ρ01 − 1
)
ǫi0 > µ
l
0 + π
l − µl1
]
=
{
1− Φ(ẑl) if ρ01 > σ0/σ1
Φ(ẑl) if ρ01 < σ0/σ1
where:
28Migrants have domestic wages belonging to the lower (upper) tail of the truncation of ln(wl
i0
) when
ρ01 > σ0/σ1 (ρ01 < σ0/σ1). When ρ01 = σ0/σ1, there is no heterogeneity in migration decisions, i.e., all
agents stay (migrate) if ẑ > 0 (ẑ < 0), as the realization of ǫi0 coincides with the conditional expectation of
ǫi1.
29The probability of self-selection into migration is always lower when wages are only locally rather than
remotely observable if less than half of the population at origin migrates, i.e., µ0 + π − µ1 > 0. This follows
from the fact that [(σ1ρ01/σ0)− 1]σ0 < σ2 whenever ρ01 ∈ (−1, 1).
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ẑl =
µl0 + π
l − µl1
σ0
(
σ1
σ0
ρ01 − 1
)
Bertoli (2010, p. 91) demonstrates that:
Q̂l1 = γ̂λ(ẑ
l)
where:
γ̂ =
{
σ01
σ0
if ρ01 > σ0/σ1
−σ01
σ0
1−Φ(ẑl)
Φ(ẑl)
if ρ01 < σ0/σ1
Thus, when wages are only locally observable, migrants are positively selected on un-
observables if and only if ρ01 > σ0/σ1 or ρ01 < 0. The alternative informational structure
adopted by Bertoli (2010b) reduces the scope for a a positive selection on unobservables com-
pared to Borjas (1987), as depicted in Figure 4, but it does not affect the result in Proposition
1: a scale-invariant increase in selectivity can reduce migrants’ quality when migrants’ are
positively selected on unobservables. Specifically, when wages are only locally observable and
positively selected on unobservables, then a scale-preserving increase in selectivity reduces
migrants’ quality if and only if:
πu − πe >
1− γ̂
γ̂
(µe1 − µ
u
1) + (µ
e
0 − µ
u
0)
As discussed in the next section, the sign of the difference between γ and γ̂ depends,
in general, on the elements of the covariance matrix Σ and on the scale of migration, so a
change in the informational structure influences in an ambiguous way the quality-maximizing
differential πu − πe.
4.4 Educated migrants arriving “with a job in hand”
Borjas and Friedberg (2009) suggest that high-skilled immigrants who enter into the United
States with a H1-B visa have a higher quality (initial relative wage) as “arriving with a job
in hand eliminates some of the initial labor market disadvantage of new immigrants” (p. 21),
and this contributes to explain the observed uptick in immigrants’ quality in 2000. Selective
policies could act not only on the cost side, as we have assumed so far in our analysis, but
also on the size of the information set upon which the decision to migrate is taken. Such
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Figure 4: Selection on unobservables in Borjas (1987) and Bertoli (2010b)
σ1/σ0
ρ01
0
Ql1, Q̂
l
1 < 0
Ql1 > 0, Q̂
l
1 < 0
Ql1, Q̂
l
1 > 0
Ql1, Q̂
l
1 > 0
−1
1
ρ01 = σ0/σ1 ρ01 = σ1/σ0
a change in the informational structure has an influence on both the scale of migration
and on migrants’ selection on unobservables. We can analyze its effects by assuming that
the informational structure changes from that of Bertoli (2010b) to that of Borjas (1987),30
so that wages become remotely observable for educated potential migrants, who can arrive
“with a job in hand”. We can also assume that the destination country adjusts migration
costs for educated migrants in order to keep the scale of migration unchanged, so that the
change in the informational structure is scale-preserving.
We have that better information reduces migrants’ quality when ρ01 > σ0/σ1 and ρ01 >
σ1/2σ0 or when ρ01 < 0 if the scale k of migration is sufficiently small,
31 as depicted in
Figure 5. Remarkably, the proposed change in the informational structure is detrimental for
migrants’ quality when unobservable skills can be easily transferred across countries, i.e., ρ01
30Specifically, migration costs πe have to be increased to keep the scale of migration unchanged when
Φ(ze) > 1/2 and ρ01 ∈ (−1, 1).
31See Appendix A.4 for a derivation of these results.
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Figure 5: Change in the informational structure and migrants’ quality
0
−1
1
ρ01 = σ0/σ1 ρ01 = σ1/σ0 ρ01 = σ1/2σ0
Qe1(k) > Q̂
e
1(k)
Qe1(k) < Q̂
e
1(k)
Qe1(k) R Q̂e1(k)
σ1/σ0
ρ01
Note: the figure is drawn under the assumption that µe
0
+ πe > µe
1
.
is high, and the destination country offers a reward to ability that can be up to twice as large
as the one at origin. Hence, expanding the policy instruments that destination countries have
at their disposal can either weaken or strengthen our argument that an increase in selectivity
can reduce migrants’ quality.
Notice also that once we introduce different informational structures for educated and
uneducated agents,32 then we have that different patterns of selection on unobservables for
the two groups can prevail. Specifically, as implied by Figure 4, educated migrants are pos-
itively selected while uneducated migrants are negatively selected on unobservables when
0 < ρ01 < min{σ1/σ0, σ0/σ1}. When this is the case, then a scale-preserving increase in
selectivity reduces the average wage for both educated and uneducated migrants. This
32Specifically, wages are remotely observable a` la Borjas (1987) for educated agents and only locally
observable a` la Bertoli (2010b) for uneducated agents
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occurs as the reduction in migration costs for educated agents dilutes their positive selec-
tion on unobservables, while the simultaneous increase in migration costs for uneducated
agents exacerbates the intensity of their negative selection on unobservables. This, in turn,
strengthens our theoretical prediction the possible detrimental impact on migrants’ quality
of an increase in selectivity.
5 Conclusion
The effect on migrants’ quality produced by an increase in the selectivity of immigration
policies based on potential migrants’ observable characteristics crucially depends on how the
policy change influences migrants’ selection on unobservables, such as ability and motivation,
that influence their wages at destination. Our theoretical model shows that a scale-preserving
increase in the share of educated migrants can actually reduce migrants’ quality when mi-
grants have, on average, a higher level of ability than stayers. The relevance of individual
characteristics that remain unobserved for immigration officers in explaining observed differ-
ences in earnings suggest that the scope for perverse effects of selective immigration policies
could be more than a theoretical curiosity.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We can rely on the definition of the Inverse Mills ratio λ(zl), with l ∈ {e, u}, to rewrite (10)
as follows:
y(πe, πu) =
1
n(πe, πu)
[α ([1− Φ(ze)]µe1 + γφ(z
e)) + (1− α) ([1− Φ(zu)]µu1 + γφ(z
u))]
Deriving this expression with respect to πu, with πe = fk(π
u), and using the fact that
∂φ(zl)/∂zl = −zlφ(zl), we get:
∂y[fk(π
u), πu]
∂πu
=
(1− α)φ(zu)
σ2n(πe, πu)
[µe1 − µ
u
1 + γ(z
e − zu)]
The fraction on the right hand side of the expression above is always positive, so that its
sign is determined by the sign of the term between brackets. When migrants are positively
selected on unobservables, i.e., γ > 0, the term between brackets is negative if and only if
ze − zu < −
µe1 − µ
u
1
γ
Using the definitions of ze and zu, the inequality can be rewritten as:
πu − πe >
1− γ
γ
(µe1 − µ
u
1) + (µ
e
0 − µ
u
0)
This concludes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 2
Recall that πu − πe = 1−γ
γ
(µe1 − µ
u
1) + (µ
e
0 − µ
u
0) implies that:
ze = zu −
µe1 − µ
u
1
γ
We want to show that:
E
[
ln(wei1)|ǫ
e
i2 > z
u −
µe1 − µ
u
1
γ
]
> E [ln(wui1)|ǫ
u
i2 > z
u]
26
From (4), we can rewrite the inequality above as follows:
µe1 + γλ
(
zu −
µe1 − µ
u
1
γ
)
> µu1 + γλ(z
u)
Moving terms around and remembering that Proposition 1 rests on the assumption that
γ > 0, we obtain:
λ(zu)− λ
(
zu −
µe1 − µ
u
1
γ
)
< −
µe1 − µ
u
1
γ
The inequality above holds as the Inverse Mills ratio λ(zu) is a contraction mapping.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 3
Let us go back to the partial derivative of migrants’ quality with respect to πu, with πe =
fk(π
u):
∂y[fk(π
u), πu]
∂πu
=
(1− α)φ(zu)
σ2n(πe, πu)
[µe1 − µ
u
1 + γ(z
e − zu)]
When γ < 0, the term between brackets is positive if:
ze − zu < −
µe1 − µ
u
1
γ
As ze < zu and the right hand side of the inequality above is positive, then this condition
is always satisfied.
A.4 Change in the informational structure and migrants’ quality
A scale-preserving change in the informational structure, with wages for educated individuals
only being not just locally but also remotely observable, increases educated migrants’ quality,
i.e., Qe1(k) > Q̂
e
1(k), if and only if:
σ12
σ2
= γ > γ̂ =
{
σ01
σ0
if ρ01 > σ0/σ1
−1−Φ(ẑ)
Φ(ẑ)
σ01
σ0
if ρ01 < σ0/σ1
(13)
where ẑe gives rise to a scale of migration equal to k under the informational structure
in ?. We have that (13) clearly holds when γ̂ < 0 < γ, i.e., ρ01 < min{σ1/σ0, σ0/σ1}. When
ρ01 > σ0/σ1, then (13) can be rewritten as:
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σ21 − σ01
(σ21 + σ
2
0 − 2σ01)
1/2
>
σ01
σ0
Moving terms around, and taking both sides to the power of two, we obtain:
σ20σ
2
1(σ
2
1 − 2σ01) > σ
2
01
(
σ21 − 2σ01
)
(14)
If ρ01 < σ1/2σ0, then (14) is equivalent to:
σ20σ
2
1 > σ
2
01
which clearly holds as long as ρ01 < 1. If ρ01 > σ1/2σ0, then (14) simplifies to:
σ20σ
2
1 < σ
2
01
which cannot hold. Hence, when ρ01 > σ0/σ1, we have that Q
e
1(k) > Q̂
e
1(k) when
ρ01 < σ1/2σ0, while Q1(k) < Q̂
e
1(k) when ρ01 > σ1/2σ0.
When ρ01 < 0, we can demonstrate that the sign of the difference between Q
e
1(k) and
Q̂e1(k) is ambiguous, and dependent on the scale of migration k, and hence implicitly on ẑ
e.
Specifically, following the previous steps, we can show that:
σ12
σ2
> −
σ01
σ0
but this does not allow to sign:
σ12
σ2
R −
1− Φ(ẑe)
Φ(ẑe)
σ01
σ0
(15)
unless we introduce assumptions on the value of ẑe. Specifically, (15) implicitly defines a
threshold, which is always positive and that depends on the elements of the covariance matrix
Σ, such that Qe1(k) is higher (lower) than Q̂
e
1(k) when ẑ
e is below (above) this threshold.
Finally, when ρ01 > σ1/σ0, we can demonstrate that:
σ12
σ2
> −
σ01
σ0
> −
1− Φ(ẑe)
Φ(ẑe)
σ01
σ0
(16)
when ẑe > 0. Again, we have that the first inequality in (16) is satisfied if and only if:
−
σ12
σ2
<
σ01
σ0
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Moving terms around, and taking both sides to the power of two, we obtain:
σ20σ
2
1(σ
2
1 − 2σ01) < σ
2
01
(
σ21 − 2σ01
)
(17)
As ρ01 > σ1/2σ0, then (17) is equivalent to:
σ20σ
2
1 > σ
2
01
which clearly holds. Hence, Qe1(k) > Q̂
e
1(k) when ρ01 > σ1/σ0, as depicted in Figure 5.
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